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Using firm-level data from India, this paper investigates the distributional effects of deregulation 
on firm size and profitability. The data suggest that average firm size declines significantly in 
industries that deregulated entry. Firm entry leads occurs from the left hand tail of the size 
distribution with more small firms entering the market while the largest incumbent firms get 
significantly bigger following deregulation. Quantile regressions show that the shift in the 
distribution of firm size is non-linear with average firm size increasing till around the 15th 
percentile, and then getting significantly smaller till the 90th percentile while the largest 
percentile (95%) gets significantly bigger over the sample period. The marginal entry of small 
firms is consistent with an increase in competition following entry deregulation. Consistent with 
a decline in monopoly power, the Herfindahl index of firm sales also shows a significant decline. 
While summary statistics suggest a decline in average firm profits, quantile regressions show 
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The regulation of entry in an industry determines both the entry costs faced by firms, and 
the degree of competition between firms (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). The transition from a 
regulated to deregulated environment may imply the decline of incumbent firms as entry costs 
(regulatory) decline and new firms enter the market alternatively, while new firms enter the 
market, large incumbents may be in a position to consolidate their positions further if the size of 
the market expands. The deregulation of entry can therefore reduce and redistribute rents leading 
to new distributions of firms within industries over time. 
Recent research predicts that the deregulation of firm entry in will lead to (i) more firms 
and less incumbent power (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Alesina et al., 2005); (ii) increases in 
average firm size and profits through trade liberalization (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008); (iii) 
increasing dispersion in sales, assets, profits, (Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005; Syverssen, 
2004), and (iv) increasing turnover and firm age distributions tilting towards younger firms 
(Asplund and Nocke, 2003). 1 
In this paper we ask whether liberalization promotes competition. We employ firm-level 
financial statement information from the manufacturing sector to examine the question in the 
context of the massive deregulation that has taken place in India since 1991. The goal is to 
investigate the distributional effects of deregulation on firm size and profitability. We define 
deregulation broadly to include both domestic and foreign entry through FDI and trade. 
A previous paper, Alfaro and Chari (2010a), examines the evolution of India’s industrial 
composition between 1988-2005 by focusing on the micro-foundations of its productive structure 
across industrial sectors, by ownership within sectors, and across time. The evidence shows great 
dynamism by foreign and private firms in terms of growth in average numbers, assets, sales & 
profits. However, the data suggest an economy still dominated by the incumbents (state-owned 
firms and old private firms) in the form of continuing incumbent control in shares of assets, sales 
& profits accounted for by state-owned & old private firms. Sectors dominated by state-owned 
and old private firms before liberalization (with shares higher than 50%); incumbents remain the 
dominant ownership group following liberalization.  
The major exception to the pattern of incumbent firm dominance is seen in the average 
growth of private firms in the services industries between 2001 and 2005.  Asset, sales & profit 
                                                            
1 A monopolistic competition assumption in the goods market determines the size of rents. 
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shares of private firms in business and IT services, communications services and media, health 
and other services show a substantial increase in growth and in shares over this period. In this 
paper we investigate the distributional impact of deregulation on firm size and profitability in 
greater detail.  
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) provide a useful benchmark to fix ideas and motivate the 
empirical analysis in the paper. In the Melitz-Ottaviano model, deregulation leads to bigger 
markets and more competition. Tougher selection in the competitive markets following 
deregulation implies higher average productivity and lower prices. In a key distinction from 
Melitz (2003), market size induces important changes in the equilibrium distribution of firms and 
their performance measures. The model’s predictions for the effects of bilateral trade 
liberalization are very similar to those emphasized in Melitz (2003) in that trade forces the least 
productive firms to exit and reallocates market shares towards more productive exporting firms. 
Firms with lower productivity only serve their domestic markets. The parameterization on cost 
draws is such that   average firm size (output, sales) and profits higher in larger markets. Profits 
increase because direct market size effect outweighs indirect effect through lower prices and 
markups. 
In the context of India, we can think of deregulation as increasing market size through 
trade liberalization and FDI and domestic entry deregulation. An increase in competition may be 
measured in several ways. Deregulating entry may imply an increase in dispersion in firm size 
distributions, a reduction in concentration ratios or a decline in average firm size. Similar 
measures can be applied to firm profitability. 
A challenge we however face in this context is that in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), 
average profits and sales increase by the same proportion when market size increases through 
trade. Thus, average industry profitability does not vary with market size and makes measuring 
redistribution effects tricky. Furthermore, the period of deregulation in the early 1990s in India 
coincides with rapid economic growth.  Therefore, a dynamic model is better suited to examining 
the effects of deregulation on competition against the backdrop of a growing economy. 
 We use firm-level data from the Prowess database collected by the Centre for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy from company balance sheets and income statements. Prowess 
covers both publicly-listed and unlisted firms from a wide cross-section of manufacturing, 
services, utilities, and financial industries from 1989 until 2005. About one-third of the firms in 
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Prowess are publicly-listed firms. The companies covered account for more than 70% of 
industrial output, 75% of corporate taxes, and more than 95% of excise taxes collected by the 
Government of India (Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy). Prowess covers firms in the 
organized sector, which refers to registered companies that submit financial statements.2   
The main advantage of firm-level data is that detailed balance sheet and ownership 
information permit an investigation of a range of variables such as sales, profitability, and assets 
for an average of more than 10,800 firms across our sample period (1989-2005). We focus on 
firms are classified across 62 3-digit industries in the manufacturing sector.3 The data are also 
classified by incorporation year so that distinctions can be made across firms by age.4  As a 
result, the data contain rich detail to characterize changes in firm size distributions, as well as 
differentiate across types of firms such as incumbents and new entrants. 
Our main results are as follows. First, average firm size declines significantly in 
industries that deregulated entry (domestic, foreign) consistent with small firm entry combined 
with import competition. Second, firm entry leads occurs from the left hand tail of the size 
distribution with more small firms entering the market while the largest incumbent firms get 
significantly bigger following deregulation. Third, quantile regressions show that the shift in the 
distribution of firm size is non-linear with average firm size increasing till around the 15th 
percentile, and then getting significantly smaller till the 90th percentile while the largest 
percentile (95%) gets significantly bigger over the same time period. 
The marginal entry of small firms is consistent with an increase in competition following 
entry deregulation. The finding is consistent with Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) as is the 
reduction in average firm size implying less monopoly power. However, the increase in the size 
of the very largest firms is consistent with the prediction from Melitz (2003) as large firms are 
more likely to be exporters. Dispersion in firm size also increases consistent with Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). 
Consistent with a decline in monopoly power, the Herfindahl index of firm sales also 
shows a significant decline. While summary statistics suggest a decline in average firm profits, 
                                                            
2 Section 3 describes in detail the advantages and shortcomings of the dataset.  
3 As Goldberg et al. (2009) note, unlike the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), the Prowess data is a panel of firms, 
rather than a repeated cross-section, and therefore, particularly well suited for understanding how firms adjust over 
time and how their responses may be related to policy changes. 
4Although the liberalization process has been gradual, this does not preclude the analysis of the effects of reducing 
these constraints on the evolution of the firm-size distributions and profitability. 
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quantile regressions once again show significant non-linearity and a heterogeneous impact of 
deregulation on profitability.  
We estimate a number of specifications to ensure the robustness of the findings. The firm 
size regressions are estimated for both assets and sales. We use a balanced panel of incumbent 
firms with and without fixed effects. The fixed effects specification controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the firm-level. We use an unbalanced panel of firms to allow for entry and to 
examine the distributional impact of deregulation. The specifications include a year trend 
variable to control for the overall growth in the economy. Finally, standard errors are clustered at 
the 3-digit NIC3 level to allow for correlations in residuals across firms within an industry. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of recent theoretical 
models of deregulation that provide testable implications for our study. Section 3 describes the 
data and Section 4 presents summary statistics about firm size distributions and profitability 
before and after deregulation, and by incumbent and new entrant status. Section 5 presents the 
empirical methodology and results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Predictions from Theory 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Alesina et al. (2005) are examples of models from 
the macroeconomic literature on deregulation in product markets. Both models assume a 
monopolistic competitive environment in which each firm produces a differentiated product with 
capital and labor. In this setting, the elasticity of demand, ε, varies inversely with the degree of 
product market regulation: tighter regulation is associated with a lower elasticity. One way to 
rationalize this is to assume that the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the number 
of firms, m. Hence, ε = g(m), where g (·) > 0. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) divide time in two periods, a short run, where the number 
of firms is given, and a long run, where the number of firms is endogenous, determined by an 
entry condition. They assume that firms face a cost of entry equal to c, which comes from 
product market regulation. In the model, c is a shadow cost designed to motivate the focus on 
regulation such that many regulatory barriers to entry take the form of legal and administrative 
restrictions on entry, rather than direct costs. They argue that it us reasonable to think that, in 
many markets, regulation allows firms to make positive pure profits for a long time. Decreases in 
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c may come, for example, from the elimination of state monopolies, or the reduction of red tape 
associated with the creation of new firms. 
Product market deregulation can come from the government allowing more entry and 
therefore competition that reduces markups in the short run. As the profit rate decreases some 
firms exit the market and can to less competition in the long run. This feature of the model is 
similar to that in recent trade models such as Melitz (2003) where average firm size increases in 
the long run as less productive firms exit the market and larger and productive incumbents 
remain.  
However, to the extent that deregulation is accompanied by a reduction in entry costs, in 
the long run it leads to entry of firms, thus to a higher elasticity of demand, and more 
competition in product markets. To the extent that deregulation leads to a larger number of firms, 
its effect in their model works only through the reduction in the monopoly power of firms. 
In Alesina et al. (2005) this implies that if the markup of prices over marginal costs (1 + 
μ) = 1/(1 − (1/ε)), then μ is a decreasing function of the number of firms, m (μ = μ(g(m)), with μ< 
0). The exposition begins by assuming that the regulatory authority (the government) 
administratively determines the number of firms. This assumption is consistent with the 
restrictions on entry in India through industrial licensing and reservation policies for state-owned 
firms prior to 1991 and is also consistent with restrictions on FDI and trade. In this case, 
deregulation of product markets leads to a larger number of firms, hence, a decrease in μ.  
Alesina et al.(2005) point out that other aspects of regulation may also affect the 
elasticity of demand, for any given number of firms, m. For instance, changes in tariff and non 
tariff barriers may affect the availability of foreign products on domestic markets and, hence, the 
elasticity of demand. A simple way to modify the model to account for such effects would be to 
write, as Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) do, ε = ε*g(m), where g(·) > 0 and ε* captures the 
aspects of product market regulation. Finally, note also that an inverse relation between the 
markup and the number of firms can be obtained in a variety of models and does not require a 
model with product differentiation. For instance, it holds in a model with Cournot competition 
and homogeneous products (See Berry and Reiss, 2007 for a survey).5 
                                                            
5 Without further assumptions, the sign of  the change in the number of firms in response to a reduction in fixed 
costs(∂m/∂c*) is ambiguous. Regulatory barriers to entry take the form of legal and administrative restrictions on 
entry, rather than direct costs. Alesina et al (2005) assume that the production function, F(Ki,Li) is Cobb–Douglas 
with an elasticity of output with respect to capital equal to α, it is possible to show that a sufficient condition for 
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The model also allows the number of firms to be endogenously determined by a standard 
entry condition, but entry is costly and regulation determines the size of such costs. Firms face 
adjustment costs that have the standard linear homogeneous quadratic form. They assume that 
product market regulation also affects the adjustment cost parameter and deregulation decreases 
it. With this they are able to capture the reduction in the shadow and actual costs of doing 
business associated with red tape and other administrative impediments that constrain firms’ 
choices.  
The general conclusion that can be derived from the models in Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) or Alesina et al (2005) is that deregulation of product markets has a positive effect on the 
number of firms if it generates a reduction in the markup of prices over marginal costs (for 
instance through a reduction in entry barriers) or if it lowers costs of entry. 
 
Hypothesis #1: Deregulation leads to entry, a larger number of firms in the long run, and the 
reduction in the monopoly power of firms, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Alesina (2005).  
Tests of this hypothesis using firm-level data following deregulation include: (i) do the 
Herfindahl index decrease? (ii) Does average firm size decline? (ii) Does the average market 
share decrease? (iii) Do average profits decrease?  
Recent work in trade using dynamic models with heterogeneous firms provides another 
strand of literature that highlights the point that opening up trade leads to reallocations of 
resources across firms within an industry. Melitz (2003) provides a framework of monopolistic 
competition with heterogeneous firms that have become the cornerstone of a growing literature, 
as the model yields rich predictions that can be confronted with the data.  With exogenously 
determined levels of firm-productivity, the model predicts that opening up trade leads to changes 
in firm-composition within industries along with improvements in aggregate industry 
productivity: that low productivity firms exit; that intermediate productivity firms which survive 
contract; and that high productivity firms enter export markets and expand.   
Additionally, in a world of variable markets, import competition could have differential 
effects on firms of different productivities and pro-competitive effects through endogenous 
changes in mark-ups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2003).  More generally, changes in tariff and non-
tariff barriers may affect the availability of foreign products on domestic markets and, hence, the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
deregulation to lead to an increase in the number of firms depends on the capital share, the interest rate, a quadratic 
adjustment cost parameter and the depreciation rate. 
8 
 
elasticity of demand for domestic goods.  Therefore we expect that in sectors liberalized to trade, 
incumbent firms may contract or exit the market. Moreover, only those new firms that are able to 
withstand competition from imports will enter and/or remain in the market. 
  
Hypothesis #2: In larger, more integrated markets, firms are bigger on average (in terms of both 
output and sales) and earn higher profits (although average mark-ups are lower) (Melitz, 2003 
and Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008).  
The technology parameterization in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model also 
unambiguously signs the effects of market size on the dispersion of the firm performance 
measures. First, the variance of cost, prices, and mark-ups are lower in bigger markets (the 
selection effect decreases the support of these distributions for any distribution of cost draws). 
Second, the variance of firm size (in terms of either output or revenue) is larger in bigger markets 
due to the direct magnifying effect of market size on these variables. 
 
Hypothesis #3: The dispersion of firm size (sales and assets) is larger in bigger markets (Melitz 
and Ottaviano, 2008). There is a positive relationship between larger markets and dispersion in 
sales, assets, profits (Campbell and Hopenhayn, 2005; Syverssen, 2004). 
Tests of these two hypotheses using firm-level data following deregulation include: (i) do 
average firm size increase after deregulation? (ii) do average firm profits increase after 
deregulation? (iii) do small firms exit the market? (iv) does the size distribution of firms become 
positively skewed? (v) does dispersion in firm size increase? 
Note that the macro and trade models yield different predictions regarding the 
competitive effects of deregulation. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Alesina et al. (2005) 
predict that deregulation will lead to more firms, greater competition and declining monopoly 
power. Whereas in trade models with heterogeneous firms average firm size and profits are 






3. The Data  
We use firm-level data from the Prowess database. The sample period is from the year of 
inception of dataset, 1989 to 2005.6 The data are collected by the Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy (CMIE) from company balance-sheets and income statements and covers both 
publicly-listed and unlisted firms from a wide cross-section of manufacturing, services, utilities, 
and financial industries. About one-third of the firms in Prowess are publicly listed firms. The 
companies covered account for more than 70% of industrial output, 75% of corporate taxes, and 
more than 95% of excise taxes collected by the Government of India (Centre for Monitoring the 
Indian Economy).  
Prowess covers firms in the organized sector, which refers to registered companies that 
submit financial statements. According to the Government, “The organized sector comprises 
enterprises for which the statistics are available from the budget documents or reports etc. On the 
other hand the unorganized sector refers to those enterprises whose activities or collection of data 
is not regulated under any legal provision or do not maintain any regular accounts” (Informal 
Sector in India: Approaches for Social Security, Government of India, page 2, 2000). Indian 
firms are required by the 1956 Companies Act to disclose information on capacities, production 
and sales in their annual reports. All listed companies are included in the database regardless of 
whether financials are available or not.7  
The Indian National Industrial Classification (NIC) (1998) system is used to classify 
firms in the Prowess dataset into industries. The data include firms from a wide range of 
industries including mining, basic manufacturing, financial and real estate services, and energy 
distribution.  
The main advantage of firm-level data is that detailed balance sheet and incorporation 
information allow us to analyze how incumbent firms are impacted by policy changes such as 
liberalization that allow new firm entry. In contrast, industry-level databases usually do not 
provide information about sales, assets, and profits by incorporation year and hence firm-age.8  
                                                            
6 The Prowess database has now been used in several studies including Bertrand et al. (2002), Khanna and Palepu 
(1999), Fisman and Khanna (2004), Khanna and Palepu (2005), Topalova (2007), Chari and Gupta (2007), and 
Goldberg et al. (2008, 2009). 
7 Unlisted companies are not required to disclose its financials. CMIE asks their permission, but if they 
refuse, it cannot include these companies in Prowess.   
8 Since firms are not required to report employment in their annual reports, we observe employment data for only a 
more restricted sample of firms. Financial services are the only industry that is mandated by law to disclose 
10 
 
The data allow us to examine whether the ownership composition of firms changed by 
the number and size of firms, the fraction of sales, assets and profits by age (incumbent status) 
and by industry. We can also examine changes in firm activity and market dynamics in industries 
where entry restrictions, both foreign and domestic, were lifted. Appendix 1 provides a 
description of variables used in the data analysis.  
 One concern with the data may be related to new entrants versus improvements in the 
data coverage by CMIE.  However, for all firms that Prowess decides to cover, regardless of 
when the decision is made, financial data from 1989 onwards, wherever available, is added to the 
database.  
We address the issue of improved coverage in the data versus new entry by making use of 
information about incorporation dates. We begin with a sample of firms in 1989 and allow firms 
to enter sample only if the new firms enter with data coinciding with their incorporation date. 
Therefore, incumbent firms are identified as those firms which had data in 1989 and with 
incorporation dates prior to 1989. Following 1991, a firm is identified as a new entrant only if its 
data coverage coincides with its incorporation date (also later than 1991). For example a firm 
with data coverage beginning in 1992 is deemed to be a new entrant only if its incorporation date 
is 1992.  
A point about firm-exit is worth noting. The dataset contains a code for firms that exited 
the data via mergers and acquisitions. However, the data do not contain a flag for firms shutting 
down versus discontinued coverage. Therefore, when we no longer observe data for a firm, we 
assume firm-exit. But again, this may also reflect discontinued coverage by Prowess or the 
failure of unlisted firms to provide data about their operations. Therefore we construct a balanced 
panel of incumbent firms whom we follow over the sample period and an unbalanced panel of 
incumbent and new entrant firms where we only allow a new firm to enter the sample if data 
availability coincides with the year of incorporation after 1991. 
Goldberg et al. (2009) argue that the Prowess dataset is not a manufacturing census, and 
therefore may not be ideal for studying firm-entry and exit, given that it includes only larger 
firms for which entry and exit are not important margins of adjustment. However, it is pertinent 
to note that unlike the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) which is a survey of manufacturing, the 
                                                                                                                                                                  




Prowess data is a panel of firms, rather than a repeated cross-section. Prowess is therefore 
particularly well suited to examining how firm- characteristics including entry and exit evolve 
over time and may respond to policy changes. (For instance, Goldberg et al. (2009) use the 
Prowess dataset to examine how firms adjust their product-mix over time). Firms that no longer 
report sales or assets are assumed to have exited. We also classify firms that do not report data 
because of mergers and acquisitions as firms that exit the data due to consolidation. 
 
4. Summary Statistics 
 
4.1 The Evolution of Firm Size and Firm Profits 
 
Table 1 includes information on industry concentration (the Herfindahl index9), firm size, 
profitability and dispersion measures (coefficient of variation calculated by assets and sales). 
Underlying average market share values are calculated for a given firm across the years in a sub-
period and then the Herfindahl index is calculated by industry for a given sub-period. It may be 
noted that the Prowess database provides four-and-five-digit industry classifications for most 
firms. However, because the liberalization policies were enacted at the three-digit level, industry 
concentration accordingly is computed at the three-digit level. We present data for the full 
sample first and then by incumbents and new entrants.  
For the overall economy, Table 1 shows a reduction in market concentration for the 
average firm throughout the sample period. The Herfindahl indices suggest an increased degree 
of competition among firms in India. This finding is consistent with the earlier evidence on 
increased firm-activity and overall higher dynamism in the economy.  
 The coefficient of variation (for both sales and assets) also indicates increased dispersion.  
Overall, what emerges is a picture of the average manufacturing firm in India growing smaller, 
in terms of assets, sales and profits, along with a substantial increase in heterogeneity increased 
over the period.  
In terms of the differences in incumbent status, for the average incumbent firm, 
dispersion has also increased. Overall, the average incumbent firm has grown bigger, more 
                                                            
9 The Herfindahl index is an indicator of the degree of competition among firms in an industry. It is defined as the 
square of the market shares of each firm in an industry. The value of the Herfindahl index can range from zero in 




profitable and somewhat more dissimilar.10  While new entrants have also grown significantly in 
terms of sales, assets and profits, it is striking to note that the incumbent firms are considerably 
bigger than the new entrants. This suggests, consistent with international evidence, that young 
firms tend to be small in size and entry takes place from the left hand tail of the size distribution. 
For new entrants, dispersion also increases during the sample period.  
The total market share variable here refers to the fraction of sales accounted by 
incumbent and new entrant firms relative to the total sales in a particular industry. It is 
interesting to note that the average market share of incumbent firms in total sales declines from 
99% to 79% between 1989 and 2005. Mirroring this decline in average incumbent shares is the 
increase in the average market share of new entrants incorporated after 1991 from 1% to 24% 
over the same period.11 
Table 2 presents information by year of incorporation (between pre-1947, 1947-1985, 
1985-2005) for number of firms, firm size, assets, sales, employment, profitability, and rate of 
return and their evolution in the different periods of study.  The oldest firm in the sample 
(Howrah Mills Company Ltd.) was incorporated in 1825, and the sample begins with over 390 
manufacturing firms that were incorporated before independence. From this group some firms 
exit the sample through mergers. Many of these older firms (pre-independence), however, 
remain in operation following the reforms. 
Tables 3a-c describe how firms evolved before and after in industries that enacted 
specific reforms: liberalization of foreign direct investment, trade liberalization and domestic 
market deregulation.12  
One interesting pattern that emerges from all three panels is that market concentration  
seems to have diminished for the liberalizing industries dramatically, following domestic market 
regulation, FDI deregulation and trade liberalization (perhaps not very surprising, given the 
                                                            
10 Note that the average firm profit, sales and assets measures were constructed by taking firm averages by year and 
industry and then averaging these measures across industries and years with a given time period. For example the 
average firm asset size of Rs.(crore) 69.15 was constructed by taking the average of average firm assets by industry 
across industries and over the two year period 1989-1990. 
11 Note that the market shares of incumbents and new entrants do not sum to exactly 100% for the following reason. 
The total market share measure for incumbents was constructed by taking the ratio of total incumbent sales to total 
industry sales by NIC3 industry and taking an average of this ratio across industries. Similarly, the total market 
share of new entrants was constructed by taking the ratio of total new entrant sales to total industry sales by NIC3 
industry and then averaging this ratio across industries. 
12 Variations in the number of industries in Tables10a before and after liberalization reflect entry or exit by different 
owner categories into industries that were liberalized. The number of industries in the results for the full sample 
gives the maximum number of liberalized industries.  
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extent of regulation and lingering restrictions) and consistent with declining incumbent 
monopoly power following liberalization. The value of the Herfindahl index declines from 0.43 
to 0.27 for industries that liberalized FDI, from 0.48 to 0.27 and 0.26 for industries that 
liberalized trade and deregulated domestic entry, respectively. 
Table 3a shows measures of measures of market share, firm size, profits and dispersion 
averaged across sectors that were for the period before FDI liberalization in the first column and 
after FDI liberalization in the second one. The FDI reforms in 1991 reduced barriers to foreign 
entry in a subset of industries. According to the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991, automatic 
approval was granted for foreign direct investment of up to 51% in 46 of 96 three-digit industrial 
categories (Office of the Economic Advisor, 2001). In the remaining 50 industries, the state 
continued to require that foreign investors obtain approval for entry. The top panel of the table 
shows the results for the whole sample and the lower ones by incumbent. The sample is 
restricted to industries that deregulated foreign investment, to two years before (1989-1990) and 
to five years after (1991-1995) the policy was implemented in 1991.  
 For the average firm, market shares declined significantly following the policy change in 
liberalized industries as did average firm profits, sales and assets. Dispersion (both in terms of 
assets and sales) increased following the reforms. The average incumbent firm in the liberalized 
industries also experienced a decline in market shares, and firm size. However, average 
incumbent firm profits in liberalized industries appear to have remained stable. The coefficient of 
variation for incumbent firms increased somewhat. 
Table 3b presents similar results for trade liberalization. First, it is important to note that 
trade liberalization in 1991 was inversely related to industry concentration before 1991. Second, 
following trade liberalization, the market share, size and profitability of the average firm in 
industries that liberalized trade declined significantly five years following the policy change. 
Third, dispersion also increased following trade liberalization. Looking at incumbent firms a 
similar pattern obtains except for incumbent firm profits that appear remarkably stable even after 
liberalization. Finally, 3c shows similar summary statistics for pre- and post-domestic market 
deregulation which shows a similar pattern of declining market shares, size and average firm 
profits and increased dispersion.  
Strictly speaking, a firm’s market share is equal to firm sales relative to total domestic 
industry sales plus imports in that industry. If time-series data were available for imports by 3-
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digit NIC code, we would be in a position to adjust our market share calculations for imports. A 
caveat to our analysis is therefore that we do not take import figures into account. 
Overall, summary statistics suggest that industry concentration, average market shares, 
firm size and profits all decline in industries that experienced either de-licensing or FDI and/or 
trade liberalization. The coefficient of variation in average firm sales and assets increased 
suggesting that there is greater dispersion in firm size within liberalized industries.  
 
4.2 The Evolution of Firm Size-Distributional Statistics 
 
Table 4 presents detailed distributional statistics for firm size in terms of log sales and log 
assets before and after liberalization. For both assets and sales, the mean and median numbers 
suggest that firm size declined over the sample period and the pattern holds for incumbent firms 
as well. New entrants on the other hand experience an increase in firm size, perhaps not 
surprisingly.  
Examining the tails of the size distribution reveals two interesting patterns. First, we see 
that the smallest firms in the left hand tail of the size distribution have become smaller over time. 
The firms in the tenth percentile have grown considerably smaller over the post liberalization 
period. The data suggests also that firm entry has taken place in the form of small firms 
especially since the new entrants are much smaller than the incumbent firms in the lowest 
percentiles of size for both assets and sales. 
Second, the largest firms have grown bigger. For all three samples, the full sample, 
incumbents and new entrants the largest firms in the 99th percentile have grown larger over time. 
It is particularly interesting to note the increase in the size of the largest new entrants.  
These two patterns from the distributional data (small firms getting smaller and big firms 
bigger) are consistent with an increase in the standard deviation in the size distribution. Also 
given the increase in the standard deviation of firm size and the fall in the average firm size, it is 
perhaps not surprising that dispersion measured by the coefficient of variation in firm size rises.  
Note that these preliminary findings from the size distribution data are not entirely 
consistent with the predictions from Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) which 
expect that average firm size should rise. While the largest firms increase in size, there also 
appears to be considerable entry from the left hand tail of the distribution and the average size 
for the smallest incumbent firms also appears to get smaller. In addition, average firm size and 
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average firm profits fall not rise as predicted in these models. The findings are however 
consistent with Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Alesina et al. (2005) where, on average, 
incumbent firms are predicted to lose monopoly power following deregulation. The marginal 
entry of small firms is consistent with an increase in competition following entry deregulation. 
The final column of Table 4 shows that the size distribution becomes negatively skewed 
over time. The pattern is more clearly seen in Charts 1-6. The size distribution flattens and shifts 
in the direction of negative skewness following liberalization with the magnitude of skewness 
increasing over time. The size distribution in the early years following liberalization (1991-1995) 
is more skewed in comparison to the pre-liberalization period (1989-1990), and the size 
distribution in the later years following liberalization (2003-2005) is more skewed in comparison 
to the early years. The shift in the pattern of skewness holds for both log assets and log sales as 
well as for the incumbent firms. 
 
5. Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
We now turn to the formal estimations of the impact of deregulation on firm size and 
profitability. We begin by considering a balanced panel of incumbent firms that existed before 
liberalization. To examine the impact of deregulation and entry, a restricted sample panel of 
incumbent firms is better suited to analyzing pre- and post- effects on these firms. By restricting 
the sample to incumbent firms, we are able to parse out compositional effects that occur with 
entry. We first look at the impact of deregulation on incumbent firms without firm-fixed effects 
to examine more cleanly what happens to incumbent firms. We then introduce compositional 
controls in the form of firm-fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-
level. However, a specification with firm-fixed effects cannot use this to examine distributional 
effects which occur with entry. To do so, we examine an unbalanced panel that allows for 
compositional effects to occur with entry. 
We begin with the following benchmark regression specification, for firm i in sector j and 
year t: 
 
Yijt = ai + Yeart + d Libjt + + eijt                                                 (1) 
 
where Yjjt : different outcome variables, we control for firm fixed effects and a year trend. 




Since the sample period in this paper coincides with a period of rapid growth in the 
Indian economy, incorporate a linear year trend in our estimations to more precisely isolate the 
impact of the liberalization policy measures. We report estimates with and without the year trend 
to highlight the impact on the coefficient estimates and their interpretation. 
 
5.1 Balanced Panel 
Table 5 presents regression estimates for a balanced panel of firms from 1989-1995. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of annual firm sales. Delicense is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed entry in 1991. FDI_Lib and Trade_Lib 
are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is in an industry the liberalized to FDI or 
Trade in 1991. Standard errors are clustered at the NIC3-digit level. 
Columns 1, 4 and 7 show the impact of deregulation on log sales for incumbent firms 
without fixed effects. While the impact of delicensing appears to have an insignificant effect on 
firm sales, both trade and FDI liberalization leading to a decline in average incumbent firm sales. 
Controlling for firm-fixed effects in Columns 2, 5 and 8 shows that while the impact of 
delicensing continues to be insignificant, average incumbent firm size increases significantly 
with trade and FDI liberalization. Note that the sign on the coefficient for both the trade and FDI 
liberalization dummies flips when we introduce firm-fixed effects suggesting that the average 
incumbent firm grew over this time period. 
As we argue earlier, to account for the rapid growth in the economy over this time period, 
we incorporate a year trend variable into the specifications in columns 3, 6 and 9. The coefficient 
on the delicensing dummy is now negative and significant. Interestingly, the coefficients on the 
trade and FDI dummies are negative and significant once again while the coefficient on the year 
trend is positive and significant.  
The results from the specification suggest that the impact of deregulation on firm size in 
the context of a growing economy can be decomposed into two effects: a competitive effect 
through firm entry and a growth effect. Competition through entry appears to reduce average 
firm size while the growing economy lifts all boats increasing average firm size. Incorporating 
the year trend variable is important therefore not only because it allows us to isolate the impact 
of deregulation on firm size but also because it suggests that a dynamic model is better suited to 
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examining the effects of deregulation on competition against the backdrop of a growing 
economy. 
Table 6 repeats the analysis for log assets and a similar pattern obtains. It is important to 
note that the negative and significant coefficient on the deregulation dummies (delicense, trade 
and FDI) are consistent with two alternative interpretations. The negative coefficient on the 
liberalization dummies with positive year trend coefficient could be interpreted as (i) average 
firm size goes down in liberalized industries but also (ii) controlling for the overall growth of the 
economy, liberalized industries are growing slower. 
  
5.2 Unbalanced Panel 
 
As stated earlier, with unbalanced panels we allow for compositional effects to occur with 
entry. We turn to quantile regressions are important for looking at distribution effects on firm 
size. Quantile (including median) regression models, also known as least-absolute value (LAV) 
models or minimum absolute deviation (MAD) models. In the median regression estimates 
version of the quantile regression model, the median of the dependent variable is analyzed 
conditional on the values of the independent variable. This is similar to least-squares regression, 
which estimates the mean of the dependent variable. Put differently, quantile regressions find the 
regression plane that minimizes the sum of the absolute residuals rather than the sum of the 
squared residuals.  
Since we are interested in characterizing the entire distribution of firm size before and 
after deregulation, we specify a regression specification that estimates the regression plane for 
quantiles ranging from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the distribution of the outcome 
variable of interest (size, profits) at intervals of 5%.  Standard errors are bootstrapped. 
As described by Koenker and Bassett (1978), the estimation is done by minimizing the 
following specification: 
ܯ݅݊
ߚܴ߳௄ ∑ ߠ|ݕ௧ െ ݔ௧ߚ|௧ఢሼ௧:௬೟ஹ௫೟ఉሽ ൅ ∑ ሺ1 െ ߠሻ|ݕ௧ െ ݔ௧ߚ|௧ఢሼ௧:௬೟ஹ௫೟ఉሽ                                     (2)                             
 
where y is the dependent variable, x is the k by 1 vector of explanatory variables, b is the 
coefficient vector and 1 is the quantile to be estimated. The coefficient vector b will differ 
depending on the particular quantile being estimated. 
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Table 7 estimates the quantile regression specification with log sales as the dependent 
variable and with the deregulation dummies (delicense, trade and FDI) and the independent 
variables. A second specification includes the year trend variable. The coefficients on the 
deregulation dummies display considerable non-linearity and highlight the heterogeneous effects 
of deregulation on firms of different sizes.  
Table 7 shows that the impact of delicensing on log sales for firms across quantiles of 
differing firm sizes is non-linear. There is an increase in the average firm size for firms in the 5th 
through the 15th percentile consistent with entry by small firms from the left hand tail. There is 
however, a significant decline for all quantiles from the 20th to the 90th percentile. Finally, the 
coefficient for the 95th percentile is positive and significant consistent with large incumbents 
growing bigger and perhaps being exporters as in the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model. 
Adding a year trend shifts quantile regression coefficients curve up. These results should 
be interpreted with caution as we do not include fixed effects. Also, the significance of 
coefficient estimates varies once the year trend is included. Here, the negative coefficient on the 
year trend indicates that the average firm size declines as the market size grows. The non-linear 
effects on firm size are also seen when the regressions include the trade and FDI dummies. The 
pattern of the firms in the 95th percentile getting bigger is only seen with FDI liberalization 
when the year trend is included but not with trade liberalization reducing tariffs on imports.  
Chart 3 depicts these findings graphically to highlight the non-linear impact of 
delicensing, FDI and trade liberalization on firm size across quantiles. It also serves to highlight 
the varying magnitude of the coefficient estimates across quantiles. The three panels show the 
impact of adding a year trend shifts the magnitude of the coefficient estimates on the 
deregulation measures on firm size. 
 
5.3 Deregulation, Market Concentration and Profitability 
 
Table 8 presents regression estimates for an unbalanced panel of firms from 1989-1995. 
The dependent variable is the Herfindahl index of firm sales. The independent variables are the 
deregulation dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 3-digit NIC industry level. Consistent 
with an increase in competitiveness and with the summary statistics in Table 3, the Herfindahl 
index declines significantly in industries that were deregulated. The pattern of declining 
Herfindahl indices is also seen when we estimate a specification with a balanced panel of 
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incumbent firms although with a slightly smaller magnitude of coefficient estimates suggesting a 
decline in the monopoly power of incumbent firms with deregulation consistent with the 
predictions from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). The Herfindahl index also shows a significant 
decline if we restrict the sample period to the immediate aftermath of the deregulation in 1991-
1995. The magnitudes are smaller but significant with the exception of the coefficient on the 
delicensing dummy.  
Table 9 estimates the quantile regression specification with the return on assets as the 
dependent variable and with the deregulation dummies (delicense, trade and FDI) and the 
independent variables. A second specification includes the year trend variable. The coefficients 
on the deregulation dummies display considerable non-linearity and highlight the heterogeneous 
effects of deregulation on firms of differing profitability. A note of caution is that the return on 
asset series is very noisy with extreme outliers both negative and positive. Therefore, it is not 
clear the weight we can place on the patterns observed. Once again, the specifications do not 
include firm fixed effects.  
The coefficient estimates indicate that while the return on assets declined significantly in 
industries that were delicensed consistent with greater competition via entry, the return on assets 
actually increased significantly for the specifications that include FDI and trade liberalization. 




India has engaged in a massive deregulation effort since 1991. The end of the license Raj 
and implementation of pro-market reforms have far-reaching implications for competitive 
environment in the Indian economy. Significant sectors of the economy were opened up for 
private participation through de-licensing and allowing entry in industries previously reserved 
exclusively for the state-owned sector. Trade liberalization allowing for more import competition 
by reducing tariff and other trade barriers has also been considerable. At the same time, many 
sectors of the economy have been opened to foreign entry via direct investment. 
Nearly twenty years after the reforms began we ask whether liberalization has led to more 
competition. We argue that an increase in competition may be measured in several ways. 
Deregulating entry may imply an increase in dispersion in firm size distributions, a reduction in 
concentration ratios or a decline in average firm size and profits. To examine the competitive 
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effects of deregulating entry, we use firm-level data from CMIE’s Prowess database to examine 
the changes in firm size and profitability distributions. 
The evidence suggests several interesting patterns. Average firm size declines 
significantly in industries that deregulated entry. Small firms enter the market from the left hand 
tail of the size distribution while the incumbent firms get significantly bigger following 
deregulation. Quantile regressions to examine the distributional impact of deregulation show that 
the shift in the distribution of firm size is non-linear with average firm size increasing till around 
the 15th percentile, and then getting significantly smaller till the 90th percentile while the largest 
percentile (95%) gets significantly bigger over the same time period. 
Consistent with a decline in monopoly power, the Herfindahl index of firm sales also 
shows a significant decline. While summary statistics suggest a decline in average firm profits, 
quantile regressions once again show significant non-linearity and a heterogeneous impact of 
deregulation on profitability. The dispersion of firm size (sales and assets) also rises following 
deregulation consistent with Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Campbell and Hopenhayen (2005), 
and Asplund and Nocke (2003). 
On balance, the evidence suggests that examining the distributional changes in firm size 
and profitability reveal the more nuanced effects of deregulation. The marginal entry of small 
firms and the decline in the average size of firms in the middle percentiles appears consistent 
with the hypothesis that deregulation leads to entry, a larger number of firms in the long run, and 
the reduction in the monopoly power of firms. However, the increase in the size of the largest 
firms suggests that it is important to take into account the possible non-linear effects of 
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3 digit NIC 
code #  Firms Industry
3 digit NIC 
code #  Firms
Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Abrasives 269 13 Dyes & pigments 241, 242 99
Air-cond. & refrigerators 291, 293 23 Dyes & pigments 242 13
Alkalies 241 17 Fertilisers 241 77
Alum. & alum. products 272 76 Footwear 192 73
Automobile ancillaries 343 424 Gems & jewellery 369 121
Bakery products 154 29 General purpose machinery 291 109






222 80 Glass & glassware 261 68
Castings & forgings 273, 289 173 Industrial machinery
291, 292, 
300 185
Cement 269 159 Inorganic chemicals 241,242 115
Ceramic tiles 269 72 Inorganic chemicals 242 1
Cloth 171 218 Lubricants, etc. 232 66
Coal & lignite 231 16 Machine tools 292 75
Cocoa products 154 12 Marine foods 151 101
Coffee 154 21 Media-print 221 46





322,331 71 Milling products 153, 155 76
Comp., perip. & storage dev.
221, 252, 










321,323 43 Organic chemicals 241 176
Copper & copper products 272 45 Other agricultural products 155 4
Cosmetics, toiletries, soaps & 







Cotton & blended yarn 171 453 Other industrial machinery 172,291-292 30
Dairy products 152, 154 69 Other leather products 191 62
Domestic elec. appliances
289, 
292,293,315 76 Other non-ferrous metals 272 43
Drugs & pharmaceuticals 242 626 Other non-metallic mineral prod. 269 37
Dry cells 314 7 Other recreational services 223,253 3
Processed/packaged foods 151-155 55 Other storage & distribution 232 7
Prod., distrib. & exh. films 242 1 Other textiles
171-
173,181,252 261
Appendix 1: Industry Classifications
Manufacturing (cont.)
Appendix Table 1 (cont.): Industry Classifications
Industry
3 digit NIC 
code #  Firms Industry
3 digit NIC 
code #  Firms
Readymade garments 181 199 Other transports equipment 351-353,359 48
Polymers 241 83 Paints & varnishes 242 44
Poultry & meat products 151, 154 18 Paper 210 205
Prime movers 281, 291 37 Paper products 210 66
Prime movers 291 26 Pass. cars & multi utility vehicles 341 12
Processed/packaged foods 151-155 55 Pesticides 241-242 115
Prod., distrib. & exh. films 242 1 Pig iron 271 13
Readymade garments 181 199 Plastic films 252 56
Refinery 232 15 Plastic packaging goods 252 137
Refractories 269 43 Plastic tubes & sheets, others 252 219
Rubber & rubber products 241,251 105 Polymers 241 83
Sponge iron 271 32 Poultry & meat products 151, 154 18
Starches 153 13 Prime movers 281, 291 37
Steel 271 488 Prime movers 291 26
Steel tubes & pipes 271 111 Storage batteries 314 12
Sugar 154 147 Trading 293 1
Synthetic textiles 171-172,243 158 Two & three wheelers 359 22
Tea 154 214 Tyres & tubes 251 42
Textile processing 171,243 176 Vegetable oils & products 151-153 307
Tobacco products
155, 160, 
369 30 Wires & cables 313 110
Tractors 292 14 Wood 201-202 53
Housing construction 452 177 261 1
Industrial construction 452 156 343 1
Infrastructural construction 452 91 Diversified 970 63
Other constr. & allied act. 452-453 159 Misc. manufactured articles 970 695
Misc. manufactured articles 970 695
Variables Definition
Sales Sales generated by a firm from its main business activity measured by charges to customers for goods
supplied and services rendered. Excludes income from activities not related to main business, such as
dividends, interest, and rents in the case of industrial firms, as well as non-recurring income.
Assets Gross fixed assets of a firm, which includes movable and immovable assets as well as assets which are in the
process of being installed.
Firm Size (Assets & Sales) Average firm assets and sales in an industry. For the full sample, the industry-level averages are averaged
across industries.
Market Share Ratio of Sales to Industry Sales for a firm. Also, ratio of Assets to Industry Assets for a firm.
Herfindahl Index Sum of the squares of the Market Share of all firms in an industry in each 3-digit industrial category.
Incumbent Share The ratio of total sales, assets, profits produced by incumbent firms (incorporated before 1990) in an industry
to Industry Sales , Industry Assets, Industry Profits in that industry.
New Entrant Share The ratio of total sales, assets, profits produced by new entrant firms (incorporated after 1991) in an industry
to Industry Sales , Industry Assets, Industry Profits in that industry.
Industry Sales Sum of Sales across all firms in an industry. 
Industry Assets Sum of Assets across all firms in an industry. 
PBITDA Excess of income over all expenditures except tax, depreciation, interest payments, and rents in a firm.
Return on Assets Ratio of PBITDA  to Assets in a firm, averaged across firms in that industry.
Sales Growth (Industry Sales -Lagged Industry Sales )/Lagged Industry Sales  in that industry.
Coefficient of Variation Ratio of standard deviation to mean of assets, sales, return on assets at the industry level
Tade liberalization measure Percentage decrease in tariffs at the three-digit industry level between 1986-1990 and 1991-1995.
NIC Code Three-digit industry code includes manufacturing, financial, and service sectors.
Appendix 2 - Description of Variables
1989-1990 1991-1995 1996-1998 1999-2002 2003-2005
 
NIC3 Herfindahl Index (sales) 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.24
Average Firm Profits  (Rs. Crore) 8.43 6.93 7.17 6.16 7.36
Average Firm Size (Assets Rs. Crore) 69.15 58.11 64.77 62.70 57.56
Average Firm Size (Sales Rs. Crore) 73.63 62.11 61.46 58.11 60.96
 
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Assets) 5.39 5.39 7.11 8.89 10.11
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Sales) 5.49 5.49 6.32 6.77 7.88
TotalMarket Share (sales) 0.99 0.97 0.92 0.87 0.79
Average Firm Profits  (Rs. Crore) 8.33 7.14 8.21 7.46 9.86
Average Firm Size (Assets Rs. Crore) 67.64 59.35 71.86 73.46 73.73
Average Firm Size (Sales Rs. Crore) 70.75 54.61 65.15 69.07 80.14
 
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Assets) 5.32 6.11 5.63 6.18 7.27
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Sales) 5.404 5.979 7.04 9.38 9.95
Total Market Share (sales) 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.24
Average Firm Profits  (Rs. Crore) 2.71 1.82 1.21 1.90 2.53
Average Firm Size (Assets Rs. Crore) 22.71 14.76 21.26 42.72 25.77
Average Firm Size (Sales Rs. Crore) 27.90 12.24 10.85 19.08 22.64
 
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Assets) 5.92 6.52 6.04 6.55 6.66
Coefficient of Variation of Firm Size (Sales) 1.88 2.55 2.64 5.91 4.59
Appendix 2 provides variable definitions.




I II III IV V
Incorporation/Period 1988-1990 1991-1995 1996-1998 1999-2002 2003-2005
Pre-independence
Assets (Rs. Crore) 87 97 130 129 134
Sales (Rs. Crore) 103 98 116 109 113
PBDIT (Rs. Crore) 11 13 16 15 17
ROA (%) 12 12 10 5 6
No. of firms=390
c1947-1985
Assets (Rs. Crore) 87 85 98 103 109
Sales (Rs. Crore) 83 67 79 93 107
PBDITA (Rs. Crore) 10 10 12 11 15
ROA (%) 14 13 9 6 8
No. of firms=1,486
c1985-2005
Assets (Rs. Crore) 32 25 31 43 44
Sales (Rs. Crore) 19 11 15 25 30
PBDIT (Rs. Crore) 2 2 2 3 4
ROA (%) 10 9 6 6 1
No. of firms=3,303
Source: Prowess Data Set. See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for detailed explanation of variables.
Table 2: Year of Incorporation
Table 3: The Evolution of Firm Size & Market Concentration in Manufacturing (Liberalized Industries)
1989-1990 1991-1995 1989-1990 1991-1995
Herfindahl Index 0.43 0.27 Herfindahl Index 0.48 0.27
Market Share (sales) 3.31 1.69 Market Share (sales) 2.69 1.36
Firm Profits 8.18 6.53 Firm Profits 10.91 7.71
Firm Size (Assets Rs. 65.47 49.87 Firm Size (Assets Rs. 86.19 65.79
Firm Size (Sales Rs. 64.50 42.30 Firm Size (Sales Rs. 101.33 62.46
   
CV Firm Size (Assets) 2.58 3.02 CV Firm Size (Assets) 5.59 6.63
CV Firm Size (Sales) 2.24 3.03 CV Firm Size (Sales) 5.99 7.59
     
Market Share (sales) 3.32 2.003 Market Share (sales) 2.74 1.68
Firm Profits 8.4 8.26 Firm Profits 11.38 10.14
Firm Size (Assets Rs. 67.1 61.58 Firm Size (Assets Rs. 89.75 84.9
Firm Size (Sales Rs. 65.9 53.68 Firm Size (Sales Rs. 105.74 83.55
  
CV Firm Size (Assets) 2.56 2.79 CV Firm Size (Assets) 5.51 6.06
CV Firm Size (Sales) 2.22 2.72 CV Firm Size (Sales) 5.89 6.7
1989-1990 1991-1995
Herfindahl Index 0.48 0.26
Market Share (sales) 3.32 1.64
Firm Profits 8.63 6.22
Firm Size (Assets Rs. 68.96 52.59
Firm Size (Sales Rs. 65.47 43.22
 
CV Firm Size (Assets) 4.91 5.81
CV Firm Size (Sales) 3.50 4.09
   
Market Share (sales) 3.31 2.01
Firm Profits 9.02 8.00
Firm Size (Assets Rs. 71.8 66.3
Firm Size (Sales Rs. 68.18 55.42
 
CV Firm Size (Assets) 4.84 5.38












N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
Full Sample
1989-1990 3,084 1.63 3.14 3.03 6.83 9.59 1.42 0.45 0.02
1991-1995 14,675 0.23 2.41 2.51 6.37 9.91 1.83 0.76 -0.62
1991-2005 62,776 -0.49 2.12 2.33 6.42 10.81 2.10 0.99 -0.70
N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
Incumbents
1989-1990 3,045 1.63 3.14 3.03 6.83 9.59 1.43 0.45 0.03
1991-1995 13,463 0.52 2.54 2.61 6.47 9.91 1.74 0.69 -0.55
1991-2005 48,454 -0.14 2.34 2.51 6.58 10.81 2.05 0.88 -0.73
N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
New Entrants
1991-1995 1212 -1.86 0.93 1.17 4.72 5.86 2.04 2.19 -0.62
1991-2005 14,322 -1.39 1.40 1.68 5.53 9.33 2.10 1.50 -0.70
N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
Full Sample





1989-1990 3,120 1.41 2.97 2.82 6.97 9.20 1.41 0.48 0.42
1991-1995 15,597 0.67 2.48 2.39 6.65 9.45 1.58 0.64 0.13
1991-2005 70,902 0.27 2.29 2.25 6.73 10.15 1.83 0.80 -0.30
N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
Incumbents
1989-1990 3081 1.42 2.98 2.82 6.99 9.20 1.42 0.48 0.43
1991-1995 11,779 0.82 2.59 2.46 6.72 9.45 1.54 0.59 0.27
1991-2005 53,948 0.53 2.51 2.44 6.91 10.15 1.76 0.70 -0.09
N p10 mean p50 p99 max sd cv skewness
New Entrants
1991-1995 1718 -0.40 1.44 1.47 4.90 7.00 1.52 1.06 -0.37
1991-2005 16,954 -0.45 1.58 1.67 5.65 8.93 1.87 1.18 -0.76
Log Assets
Log Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales Sales
Delicence -0.0848 0.0578 -0.1640***
(0.137) (0.137) (0.044)
FDI_Lib -0.4157*** 0.1484*** -0.0910***
(0.132) (0.025) (0.033)
Trade_Lib -0.2087* 0.1301*** -0.1109***
(0.106) (0.03) (0.032)
Year Trend 0.0666*** 0.0707*** 0.0716***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant 2.6920*** 2.6593*** 2.4053*** 2.9433*** 2.5759*** 2.4083*** 2.7919*** 2.5981*** 2.4083***
(0.077) (0.008) (0.027) (0.13) (0.016) (0.031) (0.097) (0.017) (0.032)
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648 16,648
R-squared 0 0.922 0.925 0.013 0.923 0.925 0.004 0.922 0.925
This table presents regression estimates for a balanced panel of firms from 1989-1995. The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual 
firm sales. Delicense is is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed entry in 1991. FDI_Lib and 
Trade_Lib are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is in an industry the liberlized to FDI or Trade in 1991. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 5: Deregulation and Firm Size (Log Sales)
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a)
Rhs Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets Assets
Delicence -0.0174 0.1825*** -0.1398***
(0.135) (0.031) (0.033)
FDI_LIB -0.3087** 0.2233*** -0.1422***
(0.137) (0.018) (0.025)
Trade_Lib -0.1781 0.2182*** -0.1367***
(0.113) (0.015) (0.028)
Year Trend 0.0965*** 0.1078*** 0.1052***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 2.7071*** 2.6613*** 2.2924*** 2.9047*** 2.5573*** 2.3012*** 2.8053*** 2.5779*** 2.2986***
(0.075) (0.007) (0.028) (0.136) (0.012) (0.024) (0.104) (0.009) (0.026)
Fixed Effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observation 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115 17,115
R-squared 0 0.938 0.947 0.009 0.94 0.948 0.003 0.94 0.947
This table presents regression estimates for a balanced panel of firms from 1989-1995. The dependent variable is the 
logarithm of annual firm assets. Delicense is is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed 
entry in 1991. FDI_LIB and Trade_Lib are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is in an idustry the liberlized to 
FDI or Trade in 1991. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.  
Table 6: Deregulation and Firm Size (Log Assets)
Quantile Delicense (s.e.) Constant (s.e.) Quantile Delicense (s.e.) Yeartrend (s.e.) Constant (s.e.)
q5 0.1752*** (0.062) -1.7117*** (0.047)       q5 0.2123*** (0.077)       -0.2188*** (0.009)       0.7077*** (0.076)       
q10 0.0850** (0.041) -0.4359*** (0.021)       q10 0.0898** (0.039)       -0.1639*** (0.005)       1.3393*** (0.049)       
q15 0.0305 (0.032) 0.2675*** (0.017)       q15 0.0710** (0.028)       -0.1305*** (0.004)       1.6406*** (0.034)       
q20 -0.0697*** (0.023) 0.7922*** (0.013)       q20 0.0271 (0.025)       -0.1051*** (0.003)       1.8565*** (0.027)       
q25 -0.1123*** (0.024) 1.1691*** (0.009)       q25 -0.0235 (0.026)       -0.0863*** (0.003)       2.0339*** (0.025)       
q30 -0.1226*** (0.019) 1.4856*** (0.009)       q30 -0.0540** (0.023)       -0.0732*** (0.002)       2.2076*** (0.021)       
q35 -0.1057*** (0.024) 1.7456*** (0.009)       q35 -0.0589*** (0.022)       -0.0626*** (0.002)       2.3633*** (0.019)       
q40 -0.0824*** (0.018) 1.9703*** (0.008)       q40 -0.0611*** (0.021)       -0.0539*** (0.002)       2.5150*** (0.019)       
q45 -0.0890*** (0.017) 2.1959*** (0.008)       q45 -0.0607*** (0.021)       -0.0476*** (0.002)       2.6687*** (0.018)       
q50 -0.0855*** (0.02) 2.4024*** (0.008)       q50 -0.0625*** (0.017)       -0.0412*** (0.002)       2.8129*** (0.019)       
q55 -0.0729*** (0.019) 2.6097*** (0.008)       q55 -0.0467*** (0.018)       -0.0354*** (0.001)       2.9574*** (0.020)       
q60 -0.0542*** (0.014) 2.8096*** (0.007)       q60 -0.0298 (0.019)       -0.0309*** (0.002)       3.1228*** (0.022)       
q65 -0.0343** (0.017) 3.0274*** (0.010)       q65 -0.0196 (0.017)       -0.0274*** (0.002)       3.3021*** (0.022)       
q70 -0.0410** (0.017) 3.2607*** (0.010)       q70 -0.0303* (0.018)       -0.0234*** (0.001)       3.4975*** (0.019)       
q75 -0.0539*** (0.021) 3.5259*** (0.012)       q75 -0.0419** (0.017)       -0.0193*** (0.001)       3.7190*** (0.019)       
q80 -0.0706*** (0.019) 3.8154*** (0.011)       q80 -0.0544** (0.022)       -0.0134*** (0.002)       3.9488*** (0.021)       
q85 -0.0745*** (0.021) 4.1520*** (0.013)       q85 -0.0666* (0.036)       -0.0101*** (0.002)       4.2537*** (0.027)       
q90 -0.0608* (0.034) 4.5857*** (0.016)       q90 -0.062 (0.041)       -0.0084*** (0.003)       4.6727*** (0.028)       
q95 0.1567*** (0.048) 5.2373*** (0.017)       q95 0.1596*** (0.059)       -0.0012 (0.004)       5.2491*** (0.042)       
Number of Observations= 66,634
This table presents quantile regressions for firm size for an unbalanced panel of firms. The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual firm sales. Delicense is is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed entry in 1991. FDI_Lib and Trade_Lib are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a 
firm is in an industry the liberlized to FDI or Trade in 1991. Yeartrend is a trend variable. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 7: Quantile Regressions of Firm Size (Log Sales), 1989-2005
Panel A: Delicense
(1) (2)
Quantile FDI (s.e.) Constant (s.e.) Quantile Yeartrend (s.e.) FDI (s.e.) Constant (s.e.)
q5 0.3980*** (0.072)       -1.9626*** (0.063)       q5 -0.2131*** (0.006)       0.2807*** -0.076 0.5033*** (0.088)       
q10 0.1539*** (0.058)       -0.5245*** (0.053)       q10 -0.1637*** (0.004)       0.1304*** -0.049 1.2636*** (0.046)       
q15 0.0623 (0.043)       0.2313*** (0.036)       q15 -0.1305*** (0.003)       0.0509 -0.032 1.6239*** (0.028)       
q20 -0.0451 (0.042)       0.8058*** (0.035)       q20 -0.1054*** (0.002)       0.0237 -0.023 1.8482*** (0.019)       
q25 -0.0884*** (0.032)       1.2058*** (0.026)       q25 -0.0870*** (0.002)       0.0276 -0.025 2.0145*** (0.018)       
q30 -0.1278*** (0.024)       1.5435*** (0.019)       q30 -0.0742*** (0.002)       0.0207 -0.024 2.1889*** (0.015)       
q35 -0.1212*** (0.017)       1.8054*** (0.015)       q35 -0.0632*** (0.002)       -0.0109 -0.021 2.3618*** (0.019)       
q40 -0.1297*** (0.016)       2.0476*** (0.014)       q40 -0.0539*** (0.002)       -0.0237 -0.023 2.5132*** (0.019)       
q45 -0.1242*** (0.019)       2.2622*** (0.017)       q45 -0.0475*** (0.002)       -0.0283 -0.018 2.6719*** (0.017)       
q50 -0.1424*** (0.018)       2.4904*** (0.015)       q50 -0.0407*** (0.002)       -0.0422** -0.021 2.8216*** (0.022)       
q55 -0.1561*** (0.020)       2.7083*** (0.018)       q55 -0.0341*** (0.002)       -0.0794*** -0.022 2.9925*** (0.025)       
q60 -0.1622*** (0.019)       2.9209*** (0.016)       q60 -0.0289*** (0.002)       -0.0870*** -0.021 3.1587*** (0.025)       
q65 -0.1563*** (0.017)       3.1306*** (0.013)       q65 -0.0253*** (0.002)       -0.0961*** -0.022 3.3467*** (0.027)       
q70 -0.1459*** (0.017)       3.3584*** (0.013)       q70 -0.0213*** (0.002)       -0.0930*** -0.02 3.5363*** (0.029)       
q75 -0.1357*** (0.021)       3.6099*** (0.014)       q75 -0.0170*** (0.002)       -0.0929*** -0.02 3.7526*** (0.025)       
q80 -0.1043*** (0.021)       3.8718*** (0.013)       q80 -0.0131*** (0.002)       -0.0868*** -0.024 3.9937*** (0.034)       
q85 -0.1414*** (0.032)       4.2398*** (0.025)       q85 -0.0085*** (0.002)       -0.1277*** -0.024 4.3182*** (0.035)       
q90 -0.2382*** (0.030)       4.7545*** (0.023)       q90 -0.0049** (0.002)       -0.2312*** -0.026 4.8019*** (0.041)       
q95 -0.4015*** (0.037)       5.5745*** (0.035)       q95 0.0077** (0.004)       -0.4149*** -0.032 5.5049*** (0.048)       
Number of Observations= 66,634
(1) (2)
Panel B: FDI
Quantile Trade (s.e.) Constant (s.e.) Quantile Yeartrend (s.e.) Trade (s.e.) Constant (s.e.)
q5 0.5655*** (0.058)       -2.0453*** (0.050)       q5 -0.2144*** (0.007)       0.5354*** (0.067)       0.3680*** (0.103)       
q10 0.2989*** (0.048)       -0.6053*** (0.040)       q10 -0.1640*** (0.004)       0.3097*** (0.027)       1.1612*** (0.050)       
q15 0.2127*** (0.036)       0.1364*** (0.032)       q15 -0.1316*** (0.003)       0.1980*** (0.020)       1.5431*** (0.041)       
q20 0.1427*** (0.023)       0.6751*** (0.019)       q20 -0.1072*** (0.003)       0.1696*** (0.021)       1.7747*** (0.034)       
q25 0.0954*** (0.025)       1.0704*** (0.020)       q25 -0.0901*** (0.002)       0.1710*** (0.019)       1.9519*** (0.029)       
q30 0.031 (0.025)       1.4297*** (0.019)       q30 -0.0758*** (0.002)       0.1403*** (0.018)       2.1253*** (0.027)       
q35 -0.0121 (0.023)       1.7257*** (0.018)       q35 -0.0645*** (0.002)       0.0961*** (0.017)       2.3000*** (0.025)       
q40 -0.0507** (0.021)       1.9841*** (0.017)       q40 -0.0553*** (0.002)       0.0419** (0.019)       2.4814*** (0.024)       
q45 -0.0688*** (0.017)       2.2165*** (0.014)       q45 -0.0483*** (0.002)       0.0063 (0.015)       2.6547*** (0.020)       
q50 -0.0781*** (0.017)       2.4326*** (0.014)       q50 -0.0413*** (0.002)       -0.0134 (0.016)       2.8061*** (0.018)       
q55 -0.1017*** (0.016)       2.6581*** (0.013)       q55 -0.0348*** (0.002)       -0.0468*** (0.018)       2.9704*** (0.022)       
q60 -0.1299*** (0.016)       2.8868*** (0.012)       q60 -0.0298*** (0.002)       -0.0846*** (0.017)       3.1603*** (0.024)       
q65 -0.1511*** (0.017)       3.1168*** (0.014)       q65 -0.0259*** (0.002)       -0.1109*** (0.018)       3.3550*** (0.026)       
q70 -0.1768*** (0.019)       3.3699*** (0.014)       q70 -0.0219*** (0.002)       -0.1418*** (0.017)       3.5683*** (0.025)       
q75 -0.2057*** (0.022)       3.6465*** (0.017)       q75 -0.0154*** (0.002)       -0.1784*** (0.017)       3.7841*** (0.024)       
q80 -0.2156*** (0.020)       3.9341*** (0.016)       q80 -0.0111*** (0.002)       -0.1959*** (0.020)       4.0357*** (0.018)       
q85 -0.1935*** (0.025)       4.2533*** (0.018)       q85 -0.0085*** (0.002)       -0.1828*** (0.027)       4.3325*** (0.023)       
q90 -0.2034*** (0.027)       4.7003*** (0.020)       q90 -0.0054** (0.002)       -0.1964*** (0.027)       4.7539*** (0.024)       
q95 -0.2055*** (0.040)       5.3936*** (0.033)       q95 0.0015 (0.003)       -0.2060*** (0.037)       5.3779*** (0.030)       
Number of Observations= 66,634
Panel C: Trade
(1) (2)
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
Herfindahl Herfindahl Herfindahl Herfindahl Herfindahl Herfindahl







Constant 0.1000*** 0.1356*** 0.1346*** 0.0946*** 0.1216*** 0.1210***
(0.002) (0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009)
Observation 189,039 189,039 189,039 189,227 189,227 189,227
R-squared 0.726 0.749 0.751 0.732 0.747 0.749
Table 8: Dergulation and Industry Concentration
This table presents regression estimates for an unbalanced panel of firms from 1989-
1995. The dependent variable is the Herfindahl index  of firm sales. Delicense  is is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed entry in 
1991. FDI_Lib  and Trade_Lib  are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is in 
an industry the liberlized to FDI or Trade in 1991. Clustered standard errors at the NIC3-
digit industry-level in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.  
Quantile Delicense (s.e.) Constant (s.e.) Quantile FDI_Lib (s.e.) Constant (s.e.)
q5 -3.0519*** (0.554)       -9.7113*** (0.245)       q5 1.0246** (0.494)       -11.4005*** (0.421)       
q10 -1.8887*** (0.205)       -2.5932*** (0.112)       q10 -0.6576*** (0.240)       -2.5544*** (0.203)       
q15 -0.9336*** (0.123)       0.0000*** -          q15 -0.2424*** (0.062)       -0.0000*** -          
q20 -0.0951 (0.063)       0.0951 (0.063)       q20 0.4095*** (0.065)       0.0000*** -          
q25 -0.5054*** (0.131)       2.0856*** (0.065)       q25 1.9117*** (0.148)       0.5952*** (0.100)       
q30 -0.5301*** (0.121)       4.0000*** (0.072)       q30 1.8347*** (0.160)       2.5132*** (0.122)       
q35 -0.5553*** (0.118)       5.6551*** (0.063)       q35 1.4901*** (0.148)       4.3764*** (0.130)       
q40 -0.4325*** (0.115)       7.0524*** (0.062)       q40 1.1078*** (0.139)       6.1008*** (0.122)       
q45 -0.2847*** (0.110)       8.2847*** (0.056)       q45 0.8503*** (0.119)       7.5708*** (0.100)       
q50 -0.2707** (0.112)       9.4522*** (0.058)       q50 0.7652*** (0.143)       8.8042*** (0.125)       
q55 -0.2378** (0.100)       10.5575*** (0.048)       q55 0.6680*** (0.121)       10.0000*** (0.104)       
q60 -0.2215** (0.089)       11.6731*** (0.048)       q60 0.6041*** (0.113)       11.1642*** (0.096)       
q65 -0.2147** (0.086)       12.8000*** (0.046)       q65 0.5549*** (0.120)       12.3377*** (0.098)       
q70 -0.2043** (0.088)       13.9928*** (0.054)       q70 0.5124*** (0.121)       13.5582*** (0.105)       
q75 -0.2688** (0.113)       15.3365*** (0.056)       q75 0.5412*** (0.116)       14.8559*** (0.107)       
q80 -0.4312*** (0.110)       16.9432*** (0.057)       q80 0.6215*** (0.118)       16.3696*** (0.107)       
q85 -0.5600*** (0.141)       18.9560*** (0.077)       q85 0.6056*** (0.157)       18.3636*** (0.132)       
q90 -0.7654*** (0.194)       21.8362*** (0.092)       q90 0.8279*** (0.178)       21.0400*** (0.152)       
q95 -0.5784 (0.393)       26.8781*** (0.171)       q95 1.1616*** (0.260)       25.9352*** (0.192)       
No. of observations=72,015 No. of observations=72,015
Quantile Trade_Lib (s.e.) Constant (s.e.)
q5 -3.4314*** (0.328)       -8.3333*** (0.342)       
q10 -1.6250*** (0.196)       -2.1118*** (0.133)       
q15 -0.3008*** (0.069)       -0.0000*** -          
q20 0.4942*** (0.086)       0.0000* -          
q25 1.7462*** (0.112)       0.9009*** (0.087)       
q30 1.7806*** (0.119)       2.7420*** (0.081)       
q35 1.5882*** (0.117)       4.5007*** (0.088)       
q40 1.4516*** (0.118)       6.0032*** (0.093)       
q45 1.3076*** (0.102)       7.3770*** (0.082)       
q50 1.3234*** (0.067)       8.5418*** (0.059)       
q55 1.2982*** (0.076)       9.6578*** (0.067)       
q60 1.2213*** (0.080)       10.8179*** (0.068)       
q65 1.1810*** (0.081)       11.9725*** (0.080)       
q70 1.1362*** (0.090)       13.2093*** (0.075)       
q75 1.1628*** (0.088)       14.5009*** (0.068)       
q80 1.1087*** (0.124)       16.0782*** (0.096)       
q85 0.8734*** (0.126)       18.2217*** (0.107)       
q90 0.8249*** (0.130)       21.0943*** (0.124)       
q95 0.9023*** (0.166)       26.2219*** (0.187)       
No. of observations=72,015
Panel A: Delicense Panel B: FDI
This table presents quantile regressions for firm size for an unbalanced panel of firms. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
annual firm sales. Delicense is is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is an industry that delicensed entry in 1991. 
FDI_Lib and Trade_Lib are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a firm is in an industry the liberlized to FDI or Trade in 1991. 
Yeartrend is a trend variable. *, ** and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Bootstrapped standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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